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GRAND JURY DISCRIMINATION
Castaneda v. Partida, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
In Castaneda v. Partida,' the Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant of Mexican-
American descent, indicted in a county in
which Mexican-Americans comprise 79% of the
total population, has made out a prima facie
case of discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury by showing that for the preceeding
eleven years the average percentage of Mexi-
can-American grand jurors in that county was
approximately 39%. The Court further held
that such a prima facie showing is not rebutted
by the facts that the list of prospective grand
jurors was 50% Mexican-American, and that
the majority of government officials in the
county,2 a majority of the commissioners who
selected the grand jurors, and the foreman of
the grand jury which indicted the defendant
were also Mexican-American.
I
In March, 1972, Rodrigo Partida was indicted
by an Hidalgo County, Texas grand jury for
the crime of burglary of a private residence at
night with intent to rape.3 A petitjury convicted
Partida, and he received an eight year prison
sentence.
4
Partida moved for a new trial, alleging dis-
crimination in the selection of the grand jury.
By comparing statistics from the 1970 census
with Hidalgo County grand jury records, he
demonstrated that, although 79.1% of the
county's 181,535 residents were Spanish-sur-
named, from 1962 through 1972 the average
percentage of Mexican-American grand jurors
was only 39%.5 He also demonstrated that dur-
ing the two and one-half year period in which
the judge who impanelled his grand jury had
been sitting, the average had risen only margin-
ally to 45.5%.6 Finally, Partida noted that the
1 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
2 One of these officials was the judge who ap-
pointed the grand jury commissioners who made the
initial selection of the grand jurors. Id. at 1292.
3 Id. at 1275.4
Id.
5 Id. at 1275-76.6 Id. This figure is relevant insofar as it indicates
panel from which his grand jury was drawn
was only 50% Mexican-American. 7 Partida
charged that these figures made out a prima
facie case of discrimination in the selection of
the grand jury. This, he alleged, was a violation
of the equal protection clause.8
Partida's motion was denied, and he ap-
pealed.9 On appeal, the state court affirmed
his conviction, saying he had failed to make
out a prima facie case of discrimination because
he had not shown:
[T]hat the females who served on grand juries
were not of Mexican-American descent but mar-
ried to husbands with Anglo-American sur-
names. He did not show how many persons
with Mexican-American surnames or of Mexi-
can-American descent were summoned for
grand jury duty and were excused for age,
health or other legal reasons.10
The court noted other lapses in the evidence
saying that it did not know how many of the
79% were "wet-backs," non-resident migrant
workers, illiterate or otherwise ineligible for
grand jury service.1'
Following his defeat in the Texas courts, Par-
tida petitioned the United States District Court
for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the
constitutionality of his conviction on fourteenth
amendment and due process grounds. 2 The
district court denied the petition.'- In doing
relatively little impact on the alleged discriminatory
situation due to the election of a Mexican-American
to the bench.7 ld. The relevant census data was labeled "Span-
ish-surnamed." Nevertheless, Mexican-American was
considered to be synonymous with Spanish-sur-
named.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9 Partida v. State, 506 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974).
1d. at 210.
nId. at 211. The court also focused on the com-
position of the particular grand jury which indicted
Partida. It stated that 50% Mexican-American repre-
sentation did not support his argument.
'2 Partida v. Castaneda, 384 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.
Tex. 1974).
13 Id. at91.
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so, however, it engaged in a lengthy discussion
of the facts which it considered necessary to
establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
grand jury selection. 4 The court conceded that
Partida had made out "a bare prima facie case"
of invidious discrimination with his evidence of
"a long continued disproportion in the compo-
sition of the grand juries in Hidalgo County."5
Nevertheless, the court rested its denial of the
writ on the fact that a majority of the judges
and grand jury commissioners, a significant
percentage of each grand jury list for the prior
ten years, the judge that appointed the grand
jury commissioners and three of the five com-
missioners themselves were all Mexican-Amer-
ican 16
[T]his court refuses to believe that Claudio Gas-
taneda, the elected Mexican-American sheriff
of a county where the majority of the voters are
Mexican-American, would purposefully refuse
to serve four of the Mexican-American members
of the jury panel with the intention of causing a
disproportion on the grand jury that indicted
the Petitioner. Here, the Mexican-Americans
are a governing majority, and it cannot be pre-
sumed they would purposefully and intention-
ally discriminate against themselves.17
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed." It
agreed with the district court that a prima facie
case was established,19 but also held that the
fact that Mexican-Americans were a governing
14 The court held that the party attempting to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination must
first show "a discriminatory result by proving a
marked disparity between the percentage which the
'distinct group' constitutes among the potentially eli-
gible jurors and the percentage which the 'distinct
group' constitutes among the jury list actually com-
piled by the jury commissioners." Id. at 86. This
"marked disparity" must be accompanied by a 'jury
selection system containing a significant danger of
abuse; or by proving that the discriminatory result
was representative of the results obtained in a history
of cases in the particular jurisdiction . . . this being
strong circumstantial evidence of discriminatory jury
selection." Id. at 87.
11 Id. at 90 (emphasis in original).
161d. at91.
17 Id. (emphasis in original).
,s Partida v. Castaneda, 524 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1975).
,9 The court noted the applicability of the "rule of
exclusion" which facilitates the establishment of a
prima facie case of discrimination, "by showing a
disparity between (1) the percentage which the ethnic
or racial group constitutes of the persons from whom
a jury list is drawn and (2) the percentage which that
group constitutes of the jury list compiled." Id. at 483.
majority in Hidalgo County was insufficient to
rebut Partida's prima facie case. Without more,
the court held, the mere fact of a governing
majority did not disprove the presumption of
discriminatory intent which had been raised by
the statistical disparity.2 0 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari21 to decide whether or not
the "governing majority" theory was an ade-
quate rebuttal to a prima facie case of invidious
discrimination in grand jury selection, and, if
not, whether the State had otherwise rebutted
Partida's allegations .22
Essentially, the Court reiterated the state-
ment of significant statistical disparities and
reaffirmed the fact that this established a prima
facie case. Then, addressing the "governing
majority" theory, the Court affirmed the hold-
ing of the Fifth Circuit, namely that the fact
that Mexican-Americans held many influential
and powerful positions in Hidalgo County
could not explain Away the evidence of the
numbers.
Writing for a five-Justice majority,' Justice
Blackmun devoted a substantial portion of the
opinion to an analysis of the statistics presented
by Partida.2 4 At issue was which population
figures should be compared with the grand
jury statistics.
The State had argued that although Mexi-
can-Americans comprised approximately 79%
of the general population of Hidalgo County,
that was an irrelevant figure. The State asserted
that the percentage of Mexican-Americans in
the population of eligible grand jurors was the
appropriate figure to compare with the grand
jury statistics. It said that the relatively high
number of Mexican-Americans who failed to
meet the statutory literacy requirements, 2 cou-
pled with the number of Mexican-Americans
in the population who were ineligible as non-
residents, unnaturally inflated the general pop-
ulation figure used by Partida.
2
0 Id. at 484.
21 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
22 97 S. Ct. at 1279..
23 The majority included Brennan, White, Mar-
shall and Stevens, J.J.
24 One may wonder why, if both lower federal
courts had accepted the fact of a prima facie case,
Justice Blackmun was so concerned with the statistics
at this late stage. This is especially true in view of the
basis for the writ of certiorari. Justice Blackmun's
approach is discussed in Part III infra.




Responding to the argument that the gener-
ally substandard educational background of
Mexican-Americans in Hidalgo County could
help to explain the disparity, the Court found
that it was unnecessary to decide the question
because, theoretically, there was no way to
know whether a particular grand jury candi-
date was literate until he was in court to be
tested by a judge. "Prior to that time, assuming
an unbiased selection procedure, persons of all
educational characteristics should appear on
the list. ' 26 Furthermore, the Court noted that
educational characteristics were not reported
for individuals under twenty-five years old.
Believing that educational opportunities were
more readily available to younger persons, the
Court indulged in the assumption that this fact
would favor Partida. The Court reasoned that
a large segment of the eighteen to twenty-five
year old group would be literate and thus
eligible. 2
7
The Court similarly rejected the State's sec-
ond argument that the presence of illegal aliens
inflated the Mexican-American population fig-
ures. Analyzing the sub-groupings within the
census data, the Court demonstrated that by
construing the data most favorably to the State,
the legitimate Mexican-American percentage
of the total Hidalgo County population would
be reduced only negligibly. 28
Even eliminating all conceivably ineligible
Mexican-Americans from the 79% gross popu-
lation figure, the Court concluded that Mexi-
can-Americans would nevertheless constitute
approximately 65% of the population of poten-
tial grand jurors. This was still "a significant
disparity when compared with the 39% repre-
sentation on grand juries shown over the 11-
26 97 S. Ct. at 1276 n.8.
27 Apparently the Court reasoned that a significant
portion of potential grand jurors would be between
the ages of 18 and 25. Since the statutory age require-
ment for grand jurors in Texas is 18, the Court
believed that these relatively younger people would
be more likely than not to have had some schooling.
2' The &ensus daia divided the population into
three groups: (1) Native born of native parentage;
(2) native born of foreign parentage; and (3) foreign
born of foreign parentage. Since illegal aliens by
definition could only come from the third group,
the Court assumed, arguendo, that every person in
that category was both Spanish-surnamed and a non-
citizen. The Mexican-American population of Hi-
dalgo County would still comprise 76.1% of the total.
97 S. Ct. at 1276. n.6.
year period."29 Continuing in this vein, the
Court found: "If one assumes that Mexican-
Americans constitute only 65% of the jury pool,
then a detailed calculation reveals that the
likelihood that so substantial a discrepancy
would occur by chance is less than 1 in 1050.30
These data, however, were not accepted
unanimously by the other members of the
Court. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, seemed
to be particularly swayed by the alleged over-
inclusiveness of Partida's figures.3' Because the
statistics were arguably unreliable, Justice
Blackmun chose to base the conclusion that a
prima facie case had been established on the
fact that these data should not have been rele-
vant until after the grand jurors had been
summoned into court to be tested according to
Texas statute. 32 It seems apparent that Justice
Blackmun was intentionally obfuscating the
question of whether the case involved the estab-
lishment of a prima facie case by the statistical
disparity, or by the selection process. Actually,
it was an amalgam of the two which led to the
Court's decision.
29 Id. at 1276-77 n.8.
30 Id.31 Id. at 1286 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Further-
more, Burger believed that the comparison of 1962
grand jury statistics with 1970 census figures was
erroneous. He said:
The Court's reliance on respondent's over-
broad statistics is not the sole defect. As previ-
ously noted, one-half of the members of re-
spondent's grand jury list bore Mexican-Ameri-
can surnames. Other grand jury lists at about
the same time as respondent's indictment in
March 1972 were predominantly Mexican-Ameri-
can.... Since respondent was indicted in 1972,
by what appears to have been a truly represent-
ative grand jury, the mechanical use of Hidalgo
County's practices some 10 years earlier seems
to me entirely indefensible. We do not know,
and on this record we cannot know, whether
respondent's 1970 gross population figures,
which served as the basis for establishing the
"disparity" complained of in this case, had any
applicability at all to the period prior to 1970.
Id. at 1286 (emphasis in original).
12 We prefer not to rely on the 65% to 39% dispar-
ity, however, since there are so many implicit
assumptions in this analysis. . . . We rest, in-
stead, on the fact that the record does not show any
way by which the educational characteristics are taken
into account in the compilation of the grand jury
lists, since the procedure established by the State
provides that literacy is tested only after the group
of 20 are summoned.
Id. at 1277 n.8.
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The Texas system of grand jury selection,
the "key man" system, has been the subject of
repeated critical examination by the Supreme
Court. ' Under this system, a state district
judge appoints jury commissioners who select
prospective jurors from different portions of
the county. Then, in court, the qualifications
of these potential jurors.are examined. Because
of the subjectivity involved in the process, it is
susceptible to abuse. It has not, however, been
held unconstitutional.
Faced with the same selection process in
Partida, the Court held that, for the statistical
disparity to rise to the level of a rebuttable
presumption of discrimination, a showing of
substantial under-representation on grand ju-
ries "over a significant period of time" coupled
with a selection process "susceptible to abuse
or not racially neutral" must be made." Addi-
tionally, the allegedly under-represented group
must be established as an identifiable minority.
The Court had no difficulty finding that
Mexican-Americans are an "identifiable minor-
ity"3 and that the "key man" system of grand
jury selection is susceptible to abuse. 36 The
crucial issue was whether the statistics which
have been discussed above indicated substantial
under-representation over a long period of
time. Using sophisticated probability theory,
the Court found that the disparity between
Mexican-Americans' represenation in the gen-
eral population of Hidalgo County and their
representation on grand juries over the eleven-
year period from 1962-1972 had a likelihood of
occurring by chance of less than one in 10140.37
33 See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950);
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas,
316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940).
34 97 S. Ct. at 1280.
- Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexi-
can-Americans were under-represented in grand jury
selection process).
36 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
11 See Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Deci-
sion Theory to the Jury Discrinination Cases, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 338 (1966). The Court found that in the
11-year period from 1962 through 1972 a random
sampling of the whole population of Hidalgo County
should produce 688 Mexican-Americans out of the
870 chosen for grand jury service. The actual num-
ber, however, was 339. The difference was substantial
enough for the Court to find the prima facie case.
The measure of the predicted fluctuations from
the expected value is the standard deviation,
defined for the binomial distribution as the
The Court found this to satisfy the under-
representation requirement.
Having concluded that Partida had estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination in
the selection of the grand jury, the Court
finally turned its attention to whether the "gov-
erning majority" theory, as formulated in the
district court, rebutted Partida's prima facie
case. Although this issue was the basis for the
Court's acceptance of the case, Justice Black-
mun was remarkably sparse in his treatment of
it. Calling the record "barren"8 and refusing
to presume as a matter of law that members of
hitherto discriminated against minorities would
not discriminate against other members of this
group, 9 Blackmun held the "governing major-
ity" theory was inadequate to rebut Partida's
case.
In an interesting dictum, however, the Court
appeared to leave open the possibility of using
this theory in the future. In fact, Justice Black-
mun drew a virtual blueprint for its future
use. He observed:
Among the evidentiary deficiencies are the lack
of any indication of how long the Mexican-
Americans have enjoyed "governing majority"
status, the absence of information about the
relative power inherent in the elective offices
held by Mexican-Americans, and the uncertain
relevance of the general political power to the
specific issue in this case.
40
Finally, although there was testimony by the
square root of the product of the total number
in the sample (here 870) times the probability of
selecting a Mexican-American (0.791) times the
probability of selecting a non-Mexican-Ameri-
can (0.209). Thus, in this case, the standard
deviation is approximately 12. As a general rule
for such large samples, if the difference between
the expected value and the observed number is
greater than two or three standard deviations,
then the hypothesis that the jury drawing was
random would be suspect to a social scientist.
The 11-year data here reflect a difference be-
tween the expected and observed number of
Mexican-Americans of approximately 29 stan-
dard deviations. A detailed calculation reveals
that the likelihood that such a substantial depar-
ture from the expected value would occur by
chance is less than 1 in 10140.
97 S. Ct. at 1281 n.17.Seealso P. HOEL, INTRODUCTION
TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS (4th ed. 1971); F. Mos-
TELLER, R. ROURKE & G. THOMAS, PROBABILITY WITH
STATISTICAL APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1970).
38 97 S. Ct. at 1282.




state district judge4 denying any discrimina-
tion, the Court held that such testimony, stand-
ing alone, was insufficient to rebut the allega-
tions .42
In a powerful dissent, Justice Powell took
issue with the majority's failure to utilize the
"governing majority" theory in this case.4 3 He
experienced what he termed "a sense of un-
reality" that the Supreme Court should infer
from mere numbers a prima facie case of
discrimination, while those on the scene-the
judge who appointed the jury commissioners
and who presided at the trial at which Partida
was convicted and the United States District
Judge-"perceived no basis for respondent's
claim of invidious discrimination." 44 Moreover,
Powell asserted, the Court's recent decisions in
Washington v. Davis45 and Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp.46 weighed heavily in
favor of adopting the "governing majority"
theory. Those cases required proof of discrim-
inatory intent to support allegations of equal
protection violations. Said Powell:
That individuals are more likely to discriminate
in favor of, than against, those who share their
own identifiable attributes is the premise that
underlies the cases recognizing that the criminal
defendant has a personal right under the Four-
teenth Amendment not to have members of his
own class excluded from jury service 47
Powell believed that the existence of a govern-
ing majority of a particular group or race
should itself be prima facie evidence of no
41 The judge was himself Mexican-American.
42 97 S. Ct. at 1283.
431d. at 1292 (Powell, J., dissenting). Indeed, Jus-
tice Powell questioned the propriety of hearing this
type of case at all. Citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976), he argued that the "incremental benefits"
of allowing habeas review of allegedly unconstitu-
tional grand jury selection procedures are out-
weighed by the costs. This would be especially so
when, as in the instant case, the issue was essentially
mooted by a conviction at a trial where no challenges
were raised, Id. at 1287 n.1.
44 In a very brief dissent, Justice Stewart expressed
similar sentiment. He simply found that the district
court's failure to find a constitutional violation was
not "clearly erroneous." Id. at 1286 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
45 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (verbal skills testing of police
recruits not discriminatory).
46 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (denial of zoning change to
accomodate low-income, integrated housing project
not discriminatory).
47 97 S. Ct. at 1291.
discriminatory intent against members of that
group or race. Substantial under-representa-
tion in the face of such a governing majority,
as was present here, would have to be explained
on other grounds. Following Davis and Arling-
ton Heights, those grounds would be immaterial
for fourteenth amendment purposes."
Responding to Powell's analysis, Justice Mar-
shall concurred in the opinion of the Court "to
express my profound disagreement with the
views expressed by Mr. Justice Powell in his
dissent."49 Whereas Powell was virtually willing
to ignore the hard statistical evidence of dis-
crimination, in favor of what his commonsense
told him about how members of minority
groups behave toward one another, Marshall
rested his opinion on more solid foundations.
Relying extensively on sociological studies,50
Marshall emphatically concluded:
Social scientists agree that members of minority
groups frequently respond to discrimination
and prejudice by attempting to disassociate
themselves from the group, even to the point of
adopting the majority's negative attitudes to-
wards the minority. Such behavior occurs with
particular frequency among members of minor-
ity groups who have achieved some measure of
economic or political success and thereby have
gained some acceptability among the dominant
group.5'
Justice Marshall seemed almost to be saying
that the existence of a governing majority
should, perhaps, be considered in favor of the
establishment of a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation, rather than as rebuttal evidence. Nev-
ertheless, Marshall ultimately agreed with the
majority in deciding the case on other grounds.
II
Historically, the Court's discussion of statisti-
cal disparities is on solid ground. Beginning in
1880 when the Court decided Strauder v. West
Virginia5 2 and Neal v. Delaware,m it has consist-
48 Powell did not elaborate as to what those other
grounds may be. After Davis and Arlington Heights,
however, if the Court finds no discriminatory intent,
it need go no further.
49 97 S. Ct. at 1283 (Marshall, J., concurring).
50 See, e.g., G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJU-
DICE (1953); A. ROSE, THE NEGRO'S MORALE (1949);
Bettleheim, Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme
Situations, 38 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCH. 417
(1943).
51 97 S. Ct. at 1284-85.
52 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
- 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
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ently been held that a procedure which effec-
tively discriminates against the inclusion of a
particular group in grand jury venires is viola-
tive of the equal protection clause.
In Strauder, the Court for the first time held
that a state statute which excluded blacks from
grand jury service conflicted with the four-
teenth amendment.5 4 In Neal, on the other
hand, there was no showing of statutory exclu-
sion.n There was, however, a showing that no
blacks had ever been summoned for grand
jury service in the county, despite the fact that
blacks comprised approximately one-fifth of
the general population. This fact was sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. 6 The State conceded the fact
of exclusion, but argued that it was by chance,
rather than design. Declaring that argument
"a violent presumption [in] which the State
court indulged,"57 the Court held that a de-
fendant did not have a right to have members
of his race represented on a jury. However,
the Court continued: "[lt is a right to which
he is entitled, 'that in the selection of jurors to
pass upon his life, liberty, or property, there
shall be no exclusion of his race, and no dis-
crimination against them, because of their
color."'5 8 These cases laid the foundation for
the decision in Partida. Therefore, the question
is not one of representation on grand juries,
but of selection procedures. Strauder was not
decided on any right of minorities to be repre-
sented on grand juries, but on the fact that a
statute would not permit such representation.
54 One of the unstated premises which compelled
the decision was that blacks on juries would discrimi-
nate, if at all, in favor of black defendants. In this
sense, the reasoning of the Strauder Court supports
Justice Powell's dissent in Partida.
5 The petitioner had complained, in part, that
Delaware's 1831 constitution limited suffrage to free
white males over the age of 22, and that the 1848
statute setting forth the qualifications for grand ju-
rors restricted eligibility to qualified voters. The State
responded that although it had not formally changed
its constitution, the fifteenth amendment had su-
perseded its constitutional voting provisions, and
hence, the provision in the statute making reference
to it was also modified by implciation to include
blacks who were otherwise qualified. On this point,
the Court agreed, saying, "the alleged discrimination
in the State of Delaware, against citizens of the
African race, in the matter of service on juries, does
not result from her Constitution and laws." 103 U.S.
at 389.
56 Id. at 397.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 394.
The reason that proof of exclusion or signifi-
cant under-representation is material is that it
is often the best evidence of intentionally dis-
criminatory selection procedures. This was true
in Neal.
This reasoning was applied in several subse-
quent cases in which blacks had been excluded
from grand and petit jury service, despite their
representation in large numbers in the general
population. 59 In each of these cases, the de-
fendant alleged, and the Court agreed, that
the discrimination evidenced by statistical dis-
parities was intentional and purposeful.
One of these cases was Norris v. Alabama.
60
There, the Court examined 1930 census data
from Jackson County, Alabama6 and found
that that information, coupled with testimony
that blacks had not served on a grand jury
within anyone's memory, established a prima
facie case of invidious discrimination. The
Court held: "We think that the evidence that
for a generation or longer no negro had been
called for service on any jury in Jackson
County, that there were negroes qualified for
jury service . . .established the discrimination
which the Constitution forbids."'" In Norris,
however, there was affirmitive testimony and
sworn affidavits from jury commissioners that
there had been no consideration of race in
their selections of potential grand jurors. The
Court's response has particular relevence in
the context of the Partida rejection of the "gov-
erning majority" theory. The Norris Court
stated: "The mere general assertions by officials
of their performance of duty" was insufficient
to rebut the prima facie case made out by the
defendant.6
Shortly after Norris, the Court decided Pierre
v. Louisiana.64 In Pierre, it was held that the
forty-year absence of blacks from jury service
in a parish with a population in excess of
14,000, which was approximately 49% black,
was an important element in the creation of a
prima facie case of discrimination. The Court
went further, however, and coupled the statis-
tical disparity with the fact that the selection
'9 See, e.g., Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
60 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
61 The Court found that in 1930, Jackson County
had a population of 36,881, of which 2,688 were
black. Blacks also comprised 666 of the 8,801 persons
eligible for grand jury service.
62 294 U.S. at 596.
63 Id. at 598.
- 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
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procedure provided the opportunity for discrim-
ination. Together, these "created a strongprima
fade showing that negroes had been systemati-
cally excluded -because of race-from the
Grand Jury and the venire from which it was
selected."' s Thus, the Court was closely adher-
ing to the doctrine, enunciated in Neal and
Strauder, that numbers alone are meaningless.
It is the selection process which cannot be dis-
criminatory. When total exclusion is accompa-
nied by a procedure providing the opportunity
to discriminate, it takes but a short step of
logic to conclude that the exclusion was the
intentional result of the process.
Subsequently, the Court extended this doc-
trine to situations in which the grand juries
under attack did not completely exclude minor-
ity members, but included them in minimal
numbers. It was in this context that the Court,
in 1940, began a series of decisions involving
the Texas system of grand jury selection. Fo-
cusing on the "key man" selection system66 in
Smith v. Texas,67 the Court refused to hold it
facially unconstitutional. However, the Court
held that when the "key man" system was
coupled with a continuing wide disparity be-
tween the proportion of blacks in the popula-
tion and their representation on grand juries,
"the conclusion is inescapable" that invidious
discrimination was being practiced. 68
Smith is important for several reasons. First,
it clearly held that the "key man" system was
permissible, but highly suspect.6 9 Secondly, the
Court said that even though blacks were not
excluded from jury service, their extreme un-
65 Id. at 361 (emphasis in original).
66 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
67 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
" Id. at 131. The population of Harris County,
Texas was over 20% black, one-half of whom were
presumptively eligible as grand jurors. From 1931 to
1938, 18 of the 512 individuals summoned for service
were black. Only five of the 384 who actually served
were black.
69 The system then in effect was similar in its
essential elements to that in effect in Partida. Reluc-
tantly approving this system, the Court held:
[I]t is capable of being carried out with no racial
discrimination whatsoever. But by reason of the
wide discretion permissible in the various steps
of the plan, it is equally capable of being applied
in such a manner as practically to proscribe any
group thought by the law's administrators
to be undesirable. And from the record before
us the conclusion is inescapable that it is the
latter application that has prevailed in Harris
County.
Id. at 130-31.
der-representation gave rise to an inference of
discriminatory selection. Lastly, the Cotirt
found that if the "key man" system is coupled
with significant under-representation, the fact
of intentional invidious discrimination is all but
proven.
In the ten years following Smith, the Court
held that in any Texas county in which blacks
comprise a part of the population of potentially
eligible grand jurors, a showing of exclusion,"0
or intentional limitation to proportional repre-
sentation 7 1 when coupled with the "key man"
selection system was prima facie evidence of
purposeful discrimination. In the later case of
Hernandez v. Texas, 2 the Court for the first
time extended these equal protection rights to
Mexican-Americans. There, the petitioner had
alleged that Mexican-Americans had been sys-
tematically excluded from grand jury duty in
Jackson County, Texas.73 The Court had no
trouble concluding both that Mexican-Ameri-
cans were an identifiable minority and that
there was a prima facie case of discrimination.
It is important to realize that in all these cases,
the Court is attempting to steer clear of the
appearance that statistical disparities alone are
sufficient to find equal protection violations.
There must be a showing of intentional dis-
crimination which results in the disparity. With
the Texas scheme of grand jury selection, how-
ever, this was not difficult. 74
There were, in this period, two cases almost
directly on point for the Partida Court. In
Whitus v. Georgia7' and Alexander v. Louisiana,
7 6
the Court was confronted with situations in
which statistical disparities were coupled not
only with selection procedures which afforded
opportunities for discrimination, but seemed
70 Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
71 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
7 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
73 Approximately 11% of the county population
were Mexican-Americans eligible for grand jury ser-
vice. None had served for at least 25 years. Id. at
480-81.
74 There followed a series of cases dealing primar-
ily with this question, that is, whether the defendant
was able to make out a prima facie case of invidious
discrimination. These cases were notable primarily
for expressly holding that if such a case is made out,
the burden of proof shifts to the State to show the
absence of intentional discrimination. See Arnold v.
North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v.
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350
U.S. 85 (1955).
7 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
76 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
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designed to foster it. In Whitus, prospective
grand jurors were largely selected from the tax
digests. Blacks had a "c" after their names to
designate them as "colored." Similarly, in Alex-
ander, prospective jurors were selected largely
on the basis of questionnaires designed to elicit
information about individuals' eligibility for
service. One of the items of information to be
included by the respondent was race. In neither
of these cases did the Court quite reach the
process itself. It merely said that the defendent
had made out his prima facie case. The reason
these cases are so relevant to the instant case is
that Mexican-Americans are as easily identifia-
ble by being Spanish-surnamed 77 as were the
blacks in Whitus and Alexander.
Throughout the development of law in this
area, one question was left largely unanswered:
How great must the statistical disparity be to
be termed significant? Although it is by no
means clear that it would control today, Swain
v. Alabama78 does give some guidance on the
question. There, the Court held that a 10%
disparity between blacks' representation in the
general population and their representation on
grand juries failed to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination. The Court simply
stated: "We cannot say that purposeful discrim-
ination based on race alone is satisfactorily
proved by showing that an identifiable group
in a community is underrepresented by as
much as 10%.
79
The Swain Court's apparent intention to limit
the ease with which prima facie cases of dis-
crimination could be proven has received clear
support in the 1976 and 1977 cases of Washing-
ton v. Davis8 ° and Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Corp.8 Essentially, these cases held
that a party charging discrimination must show
intent to discriminate. Disproportionate repre-
sentation, standing alone, was held to be insuf-
ficient. Although these two cases bear directly
on all equal protection cases, their impact on
grand jury cases should be slight. First, neither
case involved grand jury discrimination. 2
" See note 7supra.
78 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
79 Id. at 208-09.
80 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
81 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
82 Davis involved allegations of discrimination
against black police recruits by the use of a verbal
Moreover, in Arlington Heights, the Court said:
"Because of the nature of the jury selection
task ... we have permitted a finding of consti-
tutional violation even when the statistical pat-
tern does not approach the extremes of Yick
Wo or Gomillion." Ever since Strauder and
Neal, the Court has emphasized and reemphas-
ized that it is concerned with the discriminatory
selection process, not with numbers alone. Sta-
tistical disparities have relevance only when
there is some reason to believe that they reflect
purposeful discrimination, such as the presence
of a "key man" system, or a system like that
used in Whitus or Alexander. Thus, Davis and
Arlington Heights should not alter the course of
the law in this area. The Partida decision sup-
ports this conclusion.
III
Partida is intriguing solely because of the
Court's treatment of the "governing majority"
theory. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari only to examine the ade-
quacy of this theory as a rebuttal to Partida's
prima facie case of discrimination. It is ex-
tremely curious, therefore, that Justice Black-
mun virtually ignored the theory, instead de-
voting the more substantial portion of his opin-
ion to an analysis of the statistical evidence.
While it is true that he very skillfully demon-
strated that Partida had in fact made out a
prima facie case, this had already been accepted
by both the district court and the court of
appeals. When he did address the governing
majority question on which certiorari was
granted, he did so unconvincingly.
Calling the record "barren" as it related to
the facts concerning the governing majority,
Blackmun outlined what he considered to be
the "evidentiary deficiencies" which precluded
acceptance of the theory in this case.8 5 The
first such "deficiency" was that there was "a
lack of any indication of how long the Mexican-
Americans have enjoyed 'governing majority'
skills test. Arlington Heights, on the other hand, in-
volved a decision by a village board of trustees not to
allow the construction of low-cost housing which
would have been of particular benefit to Chicago-
area blacks.
83 429 U.S. at 266 n.13.
11 97 S. Ct. at 1282.85 Id. at 1283.
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status."8' 6 Blackmun never explained, however,
why such information would have been signifi-
cant. Even if he had, the record was not devoid
of evidence. It was known that the Mexican-
American judge who appointed Partida's grand
jury had been sitting for two and one-half
years. Second, it would seem that the relevant
time frame would be that in which Partida's
grand jury was chosen. It is immaterial whether
Mexican-Americans enjoyed governing major-
ity status prior to that time.
The second evidentiary deficiency cited by
Blackmun was the "absence of information
about the relative power inherent in the elective
offices held by Mexican-Americans." '8 7 Here
too, it was known that the state district judge
and the county sheriff were Mexican-Ameri-
can. Furthermore, the Court had long been
aware of the powers of appointed grand jury
commissioners and it knew that three of the
five commissioners who selected Partida's
grand jury were Mexican-American. Even
Blackmun appeared confused on this point,
making reference to the "uncertain relevance
of the general political power to the specific
issue in this case."88 The fact is that Blackmun's
evidentiary requirements for future cases in-
volving the "governing majority" theory were,
in reality, met in this case. Justice Blackmun,
speaking for the Court, did not directly decide
the question presented by the case.
It is not clear why Blackmun avoided a direct
decision on the "governing majority" theory.
Part of the reason, one suspects, was that
writing for the majority of the Court, he pre-
ferred to be prudent and not decide the case
on such controversial grounds. Furthermore,
Blackmun was assured that the issue would be
discussed, and so left Justices Marshall and
Powell to debate the relative merits of the
"governing majority" theory in concurring and
dissenting opinions. They did so with relish.
Justice Powell made the obvious argument.
He looked at all of the facts concerning the
positions of Mexican-Americans in Hidalgo
County, noting that it is their community which
"controls the levers of power."8 9 He asserted




s1 Id. at 1292 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Hidalgo County, Texas, any under-represen-
tation of Mexican-Americans could not have
been the result of invidious discrimination.
Furthermore, he stated:
That individuals are more likely to discriminate
in favor of, than against, those who share their
own identifiable attributes is the premise that
underlies the cases recognizing that the criminal
defendant has a personal right under the Four-
teenth Amendment not to have members of his
own class excluded from jury service 0
Powell relied on Strauder and is correct to the
extent that Strauder supports this position. But
with the complexity of inter- and intraracial
problems in today's society, one is compelled
to question the propriety of a Supreme Court
justice premising his opinions on attitudes pre-
vailing a century ago.
Justice Marshall clearly believes that social
science has taken us far from the comparatively
simplistic notions underlying Strauder and Pow-
ell's dissent. Marshall's thesis, that a governing
majority may evince discrimination rather than
rebut it, however, is also flawed:91 Carried to
its conclusion, Marshall's argument that minor-
ity members who have achieved some measure
of success carry subliminal hostilities towards
the unsuccessful members of their minority
group becomes untenable. It might even require
the purposeful exclusion of, wealthy and prom-
inent Mexican-Americans from sitting on the
jury trying a poor, disenfranchised Mexican-
American. The real point, one suspects, is that
in a society of disparate economic classes, the
impoverished will not be favorably counte-
nanced by the affluent, irrespective of racial
considerations.
Ultimately, Blackmun probably relegated the
"governing majority" theory to a relatively triv-
ial position in his opinion because he never
had any real intention of reaching that issue.
The message of this case is that anytime a
significant disparity between an identifiable mi-
nority's representation in the general popula-
tion and its representation on juries is coupled
with a selection process like the "key man"
system, the presumption of discrimination will
be virtually impossible to rebut. Read in light
90 Id. at 1291.91 See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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of the Court's earlier decisions, this conclusion
is compelled. A necessary corollary is that in
any given case, the merits of the "governing
majority" theory will never be reached. For
instance, if a criminal defendant was able to
show a significant statistical disparity, but was
unable to show a selection process which lent
itself to abuse, the Court would have to find
that the disparity resulted from chance. On
the other hand, in the absence of a statistical
disparity, there is no case. In any event, the
issue of purposeful discrimination would be
decided on those grounds, without having to
explore the terrain of the "governing majority"
theory.
This dual conclusion, that a statistical dispar-
ity coupled with a "key man" selection system
effectively proves discriminatory intent, and
that the Court will never have to reach the
merits of the "governing majority" theory, is
premised on one assumption. That is, despite
Justice Blackmun's apparent willingness to con-
sider the theory in the future and his criticism
of the incompleteness of the record in this case
notwithstanding, the Court simply will not get
a better factual situation against which to test
the merits of the theory. The validity of this
assumption will be determined in future cases
in which lawyers will debate the "governing
majority" theory. As demographics continue to
change so that more and more areas are, like
Hidalgo County, predominantly populated by
minorities, the fact that such cases will arise is
undoubted.
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